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Due Process Traditionalism
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract
In important cases, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of “substantive due
process” by reference to tradition, but it has yet to explain why it has done so. Due
process traditionalism might be defended in several distinctive ways. The most ambitious
defense draws on a set of ideas associated with Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek, who
suggested that traditions have special credentials by virtue of their acceptance by many
minds. But this defense runs into three problems. Those who have participated in a
tradition may not have accepted any relevant proposition; they might suffer from a
systematic bias; and they might have joined a cascade. An alternative defense sees due
process traditionalism as a second-best substitute for two preferable alternatives: a
purely procedural approach to the due process clause, and an approach that gives
legislatures the benefit of every reasonable doubt. But it is not clear that in these
domains, the first-best approaches are especially attractive; and even if they are, the
second-best may be an unacceptably crude substitute. The most plausible defense of due
process traditionalism operates on rule-consequentialist grounds, with the suggestion
that even if traditions are not great, they are often good, and judges do best if they defer
to traditions rather than attempting to specify the content of “liberty” on their own. But
the rule-consequentialist defense depends on controversial and probably false
assumptions about the likely goodness of traditions and the institutional incapacities of
judges.

I. Introduction
The Supreme Court and individual justices have often suggested that under the
Due Process Clause, rights qualify as such only if they can claim firm roots in
longstanding traditions.1 In Washington v. Glucksberg,2 for example, the Court appeared
to settle on a kind of due process traditionalism, captured in the view that longstanding
cultural understandings are both necessary and sufficient for the substantive protection of
*
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1
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 707 (1997); Michael G. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 (1989);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2
521 U.S. 707 (1997).

rights under the due process clause. On this view, no interest qualifies for protection
under that clause if it lacks historical credentials; and interests that can claim such
credentials deserve protection for that very reason.
Due process traditionalism is hardly novel. It can itself claim firm roots in
American traditions. In his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,3 Justice Holmes
wrote that the Due Process Clause would be violated only if “a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”4 In the same
vein, Justice Felix Frankfurter explicitly urged that in assessing due process questions,
courts should ask whether proceedings “offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.”5 In important cases,
the Court has sought to cabin the reach of “substantive due process” by asking whether
the relevant rights are based on longstanding cultural commitments, or instead on novel
ones, or on the commitments of particular litigants and particular judges.6
Importantly, those who embrace due process traditionalism do not claim that
judicial practices, as they develop over time, deserve support; they offer no plea for
common law constitutionalism7 or for a strong rule of stare decisis.8 On the contrary,
their focus is on the claims of the longstanding practices of “our people,”9 not of our
judges. It should come as no surprise to find that some due process traditionalists contend
that judicial practices, constructing rights in common law fashion, are illegitimate and
should be overruled.10
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198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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See cases cited supra note.
7
See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
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As suggested in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993). The
full quotation – that a state regulation violates the Due Process Clause only when it “offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” – comes
from Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
10
See Lawrence v Texas, 539 US at 592-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course it is true that due process
traditionalists must come to terms with the Equal Protection Clause, which operates as a constraint on
longstanding practices, such as discrimination on the basis of race. Due process traditionalists might well
acknowledge the tradition-rejecting nature of the equal protection guarantee while also insisting that
longstanding practices are the best guide to understanding the scope of substantive due process.
4
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Although due process traditionalism has played a large role in the Court’s
decisions, it is highly controversial. Indeed, the major fault line within the Court itself has
long been between those who seek to limit the reach of the due process clause to rights
that longstanding traditions recognize as such, and those who believe that “evolving
traditions” are what matter,11 or that the Court legitimately brings its own moral
judgments to bear on substantive due process questions.12 A decade after the Court’s
decision, it is clear that Glucksberg failed to entrench due process traditionalism. In
striking down bans on same-sex relations, Lawrence v. Texas explicitly relies on
“evolving” judgments, rather than longstanding practices.13 But the battle between
traditionalist and more rationalist or critical approaches, allowing courts to scrutinize
social practices, has yet to be authoritatively resolved. The Court remains sharply divided
on the proper role of tradition,14 which continues to play a large role in lower court
decisions.15
Due process traditionalists have yet to explain exactly why traditionalism might
be an appealing approach to the due process clause. In this Essay, I explore three families
of explanations. The first, and the most ambitious, points to the fact that traditions have
been supported by many minds across long periods of time. The second sees
traditionalism as a second-best substitute for more radical restrictions on substantive uses
of the due process clause. The third justifies traditionalism on rule-consequentialist
grounds.
What I shall call “many minds traditionalism” has intuitive appeal insofar as it
attempts to anchor constitutional rights in practices that have been wide and deep support.
Many minds traditionalism has been defended in different ways by Edmund Burke16 and
11

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 528 US 558 (2003) (rejecting exclusive use of tradition) with id. at 573-75
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that use of substantive due process should be disciplined by reference to
tradition).
15
See, e.g., Williams v. Morgan, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 3243 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding ban on sexual
devices by reference to tradition); Raich v. Gonzales, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5834 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding
ban on use of marijuana by reference to tradition); Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F Supp 2d 385 (D Mass 2006)
(upholding “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in U.S. military but reflecting ambivalence about role of tradition
in due process cases).
16
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 416-451 (Isaac
Kramnick ed. 1999)
12
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Friedrich Hayek,17 and under certain conditions, this defense is more than plausible.
Burke’s own account was largely aggregative, with the suggestion that numerous people
have signed onto traditions and therefore given them epistemic credentials. Hayek’s
variety was evolutionary, with the suggestion that traditions have stood the test of time
and are thus likely to serve valuable social functions. On both the aggregative and
evolutionary accounts, the persistence of a practice across many minds and many years
makes it more likely to be correct, wise, or good. The two accounts might even be
developed into a democratic defense of traditionalism, on the ground that participants in
traditions are “voters,” to whom judges ought to defer. In the end, however, I shall
conclude that neither the aggregative nor the evolutionary account adequately justifies
due process traditionalism.
If ambitious accounts of this kind fail, it might nonetheless be possible to defend
due process traditionalism as a kind of second-best solution for those who would like to
reject substantive due process altogether, but who accept the constraints of stare decisis.
Suppose that the due process clause is best seen as purely procedural,18 or that courts
should approach legislation with a strong presumption of validity.19 If so, due process
traditionalism can be understood as a precedent-preserving and indirect way of producing
the results that would follow from either a procedural approach to the clause or a
presumption of validity. But there are two problems with this defense of due process
traditionalism. The first is that it depends on a controversial judgment about what counts
as a first-best approach. The second problem is that the purportedly second-best might
turn out to be a wholly inadequate way of accomplishing the first-best goals.
A third justification for due process traditionalism is rule-consequentialist. The
simple idea here is that whatever its faults, due process traditionalism produces better
results than the likely alternatives. If judicial judgments about the substantive content of
liberty were entirely unreliable, due process traditionalism might look plausible by
comparison. Perhaps traditions are not especially good, but perhaps they are not so bad,
and perhaps it is better to tether judges to traditions than to ask them to think about the
17

See Friedrich Hayek, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science, in The Essence of
Hayek 318 (Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt Leube eds. 1984); see also Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in
Politics, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (reprint ed. 1998).
18
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1983).
19
See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006).
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nature of “liberty” on their own. This conclusion depends on normative and empirical
assumptions that might well be wrong. In the end, however, it points to the most
promising basis for due process traditionalism. At the very least, it helps to show what
those who disagree about due process traditionalism are disagreeing about.
My focus here is on traditionalist approaches to the due process clause, but if the
analysis is correct, it should have implications for many other constitutional problems. It
is easy to imagine a traditionalist approach to the separation of powers, with the
suggestion that longstanding practices deserve respectful attention even if they seem to
deviate from the original understanding or from an independent analysis of the governing
constitutional provisions.20 Traditionalism might also be defended as the proper approach
to the religion clauses. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s defense of the use of the
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance was an almost entirely traditionalist
exercise, stressing practices rather than reasons for practices.21 Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s view of the Establishment Clause had a persistent traditionalist feature, at
least insofar as he would permit public recognition of God by reference not to theories or
principle, but by reference to history alone.22
In numerous domains, traditionalism might be defended on the ground that
longstanding practices reflect the judgments of many minds, or serve as a second-best
substitute for an account forbidden by stare decisis, or on rule-consequentialist grounds.
Whether such a defense could be made convincing cannot be resolved without an
exploration of the particular domains. But the discussion of these justifications for due
process traditionalism will bear on traditionalist approaches in numerous other areas.
The remainder of this Essay comes in three parts. Part II explores many minds
traditionalism. It begins with the test of numbers, captured in the view that traditions are
likely to be good or right because they have been supported by so many people over long
periods of time. Part II also investigates the evolutionary account and the test of time; it
culminates in an exploration of the claims of democratic traditionalism. Part III asks
whether due process traditionalism might be adopted as a second-best solution by those
20

The Steel Seizure Case, 343 US 579, 594-597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 US 1, 26-32 (2004) (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring in
the judgment).
22
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
21
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who want to restrict the scope of the due process clause in more radical ways. Part IV
explores the possibility of a rule-consequentialist defense of due process traditionalism.
II. Many Minds Traditionalism
My goal in this section is to explore the most ambitious arguments on behalf of
due process traditionalism, involving the aggregation of numerous views and the benefits
of evolutionary pressures. For those who invoke the test of numbers and the test of time,
traditions are highly likely to be wise, right, or good. A related argument points to the
democratic credentials of longstanding practices. Such practices appear to have been
supported by numerous people who have “voted” on their behalf. Judges might be asked
to hesitate before disturbing practices that have obtained so many “votes” over long
periods of time.
A. The Test of Numbers
1. Prejudice as “latent wisdom.” Might traditions deserve respect simply because
they have been accepted by numerous people? Edmund Burke offered the canonical
argument on behalf of this view.23 Above all, Burke was skeptical of efforts to deploy
reason in the service of “exploding general prejudices.”24 On the contrary, he believed
that it is best to try “to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in” those very
prejudices. Burke argued that the “science of government . . requires experience, and
even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and
observing he may be.” 25 In his view, sensible people “are afraid to put men to live and
trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each
man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general
bank and capital of nations, and of ages.”26

23

I explore a Burkean approach in some detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev
353 (2006). My goal there was to reconstruct, as sympathetically as possible, the nature and foundations of
Burkean approaches to the Constitution; here I ask more critically whether that approach is proper for the
due process clause.
24
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 416 (Isaac
Kramnick ed. 1999)
25
Id. at 428.
26
Id.

6

Burke’s central argument against the “private stock of reason,” and on behalf of
society’s “general bank and capital,” points to the large number of people who are
responsible for creating traditions. The “latent wisdom” of traditions lies in the fact that
so many people have subscribed to them.
Suppose in this light that there is a longstanding tradition of allowing married
people to decide how many children to have, and that there is no tradition of allowing
people to commit suicide. If so, it seems clear that numerous people have believed that
married people should be permitted to decide how many children to have, and that
numerous people have also concluded should not be permitted to kill themselves. And if
many people have reached these conclusions, perhaps the Court should pay careful
attention to their judgments. It would be foolish for the Court to use an abstract account,
invoked by lawyers and theorists, as the basis for challenging practices long accepted by
many. The aggregative view certainly so suggests.
That view has become newly salient, for a great deal of recent attention has been
given to the “wisdom of crowds.”27 Those who emphasize crowd wisdom notice that on
many questions, the average or majority answer of a large group of people is often better
than the answer of an actual or appointed expert.28 Much of the wisdom of crowds is best
understood in light of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.29 To understand the operation of the
Jury Theorem, assume that a group consists of a number of people, all of whom has a
greater than 50 percent chance of being right on some question of fact. The Jury Theorem
says that the likelihood that the group’s majority will be right approaches 100 percent as
the size of the group expands. The Jury Theorem provides an apparent basis for
answering hard questions by asking about the views of large groups of people. Perhaps
such groups are highly likely to be right.
We can readily see how the Jury Theorem might support a great deal of faith in
traditions. If the public has long rejected one alleged right, and long supported another,
there is reason to believe that many people have made relevant judgments, in a way that
gives a longstanding practice a kind of epistemic credential. Even if evolutionary
27

See James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (2004).
See id.; Scott Page, The Difference (2006).
29For a clear outline, see William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group
Judgment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. Risk & Uncertainty 147,
152–54 (2002).
28
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pressures are put to one side, the support of large numbers of people suggests that
traditions are likely to have solid foundations. On this view, the Court should be reluctant
to reject rights that are deeply rooted in actual practice, or to create rights that are not so
rooted, precisely because the Court’s judges are few and the supporters of traditions are
many. If the Constitution is unclear, the Court might do best to investigate longstanding
social practices, instead of imposing a view of its own.
2. Three problems. In many domains, the aggregative view has considerable
force.30 But as a defense of due process traditionalism, the aggregative view run into
three serious problems. Taken as a whole, these problems raise real doubts about the view
that such traditionalism can be supported by reference to the judgments of many minds.
a. What proposition? The Jury Theorem is concerned with the truth of certain
propositions. If a majority of people believe that X is true, X is highly likely to be true
(under the stated conditions). But what proposition does a tradition support? By
participating in the creation of a tradition, have people thereby “voted” in favor of some
proposition, and if so, which one?
It would be easiest to answer this question if the tradition reflects a judgment in
favor of a proposition of fact. But is there a question of fact to which a tradition offers an
implicit answer? Suppose that a society has long imposed capital punishment. It might be
tempting to say that the tradition reflects a judgment that capital punishment has a
deterrent effect. But such a tradition might persist not on deterrence grounds, but because
most people believe that capital punishment is justified for reasons of retribution—in
which case it would be hard to discern a factual proposition implicit in the tradition. Or
suppose that a society has long permitted married couples to have as many children as
they want, or that it has long forbidden people from committing suicide, smoking
marijuana, or engaging in same-sex relations. It would be difficult to say that the
longstanding practice suggests support for some identifiable proposition of fact.
Much more plausibly, a longstanding tradition is best taken to suggest the truth of
some normative proposition that the tradition endorses by definition, such as, “married
couples should be allowed to have as many children as they like,” or “people should be

30

See Page, supra note, and Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (2006), for
elaboration.
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prevented from committing suicide.” If many people have independently accepted or
rejected such a proposition, their judgment might be entitled to weight. At first glance,
the Jury Theorem so suggests.
But there are two possible objections to this view. The first is that the Jury
Theorem is best taken only to concern matters of fact, on which it is easy to speak of
truth or falsity. It might well seem jarring to suggest that a judgment in favor of some
tradition is “true.” Is it sensible to say that if many people believe that married people
should be allowed to choose the number of children that they will have, they are likely to
be right? The answer is that it is indeed sensible to speak in these terms if we are not
relativists or skeptics about normative questions, and if we believe that such questions
have correct answers. Those entrusted with the job of interpretation the Due Process
Clause had better avoid relativism or skepticism, because it is difficult to construe the
clause without thinking that it is possible to think well or badly about normative
questions.31 And on reflection, the grounds for moral or political relativism and
skepticism are exceedingly weak.32 It follows that the Jury Theorem is indeed applicable
to normative statements as well as to statements of fact.
The second objection is much more powerful. We might be able to agree that for a
long time, many people have accepted the proposition that married couples should be
allowed to have as many children as they like. But suppose that in 2050, the nation
imposes a ceiling—say, of four—on the number of children that people may have. Does
the tradition set itself in opposition to that ceiling? The answer may not be so clear. If the
nation, or even a state, imposes such a ceiling, circumstances are likely to be very
different from what they were when the tradition was in force. And if this is so, the
proposition supported by the tradition is properly described in the following way: “Under
the circumstances prevailing between (say) 1800 and 2049, married couples should be
permitted to have as many children as they wanted.” And if it is so described, it does not,
in fact, bear on the problem at hand.
31

An ambitious version of this view can be found in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006). Contested
moral or political arguments might be avoided if we could agree that the text of the clause forbids
substantive due process, and if we believed that the word “liberty” should be given content by reference to
the original understanding. But a controversial argument is needed on behalf of the view that the text
should be controlling in light of many decades of decisions employing substantive due process, and also in
defense of originalism.
32
See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Morality (1972).
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Perhaps circumstances have changed because of a significant problem of
overpopulation; perhaps a new disease has prompted the new policy. Whatever the reason
for that policy, the proposition definitionally supported by the tradition may not
definitionally decide the question that arises if and when the government imposes the
ceiling.33 Hence we may not be able to agree that many minds have, in fact, committed
themselves to the relevant proposition, which is whether a ceiling on the number of
children is acceptable in 2050. And if the nation does impose that ceiling at that time,
many minds are likely to have supported it under the current conditions.34 Is it so clear
that they do not deserve priority over the many minds who came before35? By hypothesis,
the current minds are speaking to the circumstances of the present, which no one has
done in the past.
The problem, in short, is that traditions apply only to the circumstances in which
they governed, and when circumstances have changed, it is not clear that many minds
have decided in favor of the particular tradition that is being invoked. This claim has
general implications. Suppose that there is a tradition against physician-assisted suicide,
extending from the founding until the day before yesterday. It remains possible that
physician-assisted suicide under contemporary conditions is meaningfully different from
physician-assisted suicide under previous conditions. Perhaps physician-assisted suicide
is more appealing because of technological changes that have made it possible for
physicians to honor people’s requests for death in a humane way. In that event, the
proposition supported by the tradition does not speak to the current problem. Whenever a
longstanding tradition is being violated, there is a good chance that the existing situation
is indeed relevantly different.
It is true that due process traditionalists need not be entirely discomfited by the
latter conclusion. Perhaps they would readily agree that traditions often will not speak,
with any kind of clarity, to the current question, but perhaps that is no problem for them.
They believe that a clear tradition is a necessary condition for a convincing substantive
due process claim, and if no such tradition can be identified, the plaintiff loses. The real
33

I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for pressing this point.
See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason (unpublished
manuscript 2007).
35
See id.
34
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problem for due process traditionalism is the claim that a longstanding tradition is a
sufficient condition for invalidation. If circumstances have changed, then the proposition
for which the tradition speaks may not bear on the question at hand. To the extent that
this is so, due process traditionalists will have to concede that even when a practice has
endured for a long time, it may not justify invalidation of apparently tradition-rejecting
enactments, because those enactments may not, on reflection, reject the proposition that
the tradition actually supports.
b. Systematic bias or “prejudice.” The Jury Theorem says that if the group is
larger enough, the majority view is likely to be correct if all or most members are more
than 50 percent likely to be right. But suppose that all or most members are less than 50
percent likely to be right. If so, the likelihood that the majority will be wrong approaches
100 percent as the size of the group expands.36 It follows that even if some proposition
has passed the test of numbers, it will be incorrect if most people are more likely to be
wrong than right. This point raises serious problems for many minds traditionalism.
Condorcet himself emphasized that “prejudice” can introduce a distortion that
makes aggregated judgments unlikely to produce good results: “In effect, when the
probability of the truth of a voter’s opinion falls below 1/2, there must be a reason why he
decides less well than one would at random. The reason can only be found in the
prejudices to which this voter is subject.”37 For due process traditionalists, the irony is
that Burke himself wrote as if “prejudices” are reliable, contending that a “prejudice” is
“wisdom without reflection, and above it.”38 But if prejudices are systematic biases, then
they are wisdom without reflection, and below it; and endorsement of a proposition by
many minds is no protection against error.
Suppose that traditions reject a certain right—say, the right to racial
intermarriage, to same-sex relations, or to same-sex marriage. If those who create the
tradition are systematically biased, the tradition lacks epistemic credentials. For purposes
of constitutional law, Condorcet’s reference to “prejudice” suggests the possibility that
the Equal Protection Clause might be used to test the question whether the tradition
36

See also Page, supra note, at 205-14 (showing that if individuals are especially inaccurate, group average
will be inaccurate too, though number of group errors will be lower than individual errors if group is
diverse).
37
CONDORCET, SELECTED WRITINGS 62 (Keith Michael Baker, ed., 1976).
38
See Burke, supra note.
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embeds discrimination. Alternatively, judges who engage in substantive due process
might want not to entrench traditions but to ask whether there is, in principle, any
distinction between a challenged practice and the practices that the tradition
unambiguously supports. If no such distinction can be identified, a systematic bias might
well be at work. The general point is that such a bias might mean that the proposition on
which the tradition has converged is false. To the extent that this is so, the aggregative
defense of many minds traditionalism, rooted in Burke, seems to be in tatters.
c. Independent judgments. For the aggregative view to work, those who contribute
to a tradition must be making independent judgments. This point raises distinctive
difficulties.
(i) Authoritarianism and its analogues. It should be obvious that on the
aggregative view, longstanding practices would have no epistemic force in an
authoritarian society. In such a society, many traditions are an imposition; they are
enforced by an oppressive government. If so, there is no reason to think that they reflect
the judgments of large numbers of people. It follows that many minds arguments on
behalf of longstanding practices are implausible in regimes that lack a high degree of
freedom, at least if those practices are themselves an imposition by the few on the many.
Burke’s own claims have greatest weight in democratic societies whose citizens are able
to assess and to refashion traditions; their force is greatly diminished in societies that
have long lived under autocratic rule. We might therefore understand the conclusion that
while many minds traditionalism makes sense for England and America, it is ill-suited to
such nations as China, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.39
For purposes of substantive due process in the United States, the point about
authoritarian societies might seem uninteresting. No one contends that judges in new
democracies should decide on the content of rights by asking about the judgments of their
authoritarian precursors.40 But even in free societies, there may be analogous problems
Perhaps a relevant tradition has been imposed by some on others through the force of
39

It remains possible that tradition-rejecting initiatives will cause serious problems in authoritarian
societies, simply because citizens will refuse to accept those initiatives. See James Scott, Seeing Like A
State (1999). But this pragmatic argument is not a point in favor of many minds traditionalism.
40
Of course there are complex questions here about the relationship between culture and law. Perhaps legal
initiatives cannot succeed if they fit poorly with culture, at least if they cannot change culture. For
illuminating discussion, see Scott, supra note.
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law. The most obvious example is slavery. It is implausible to think that slavery can be
defended by reference to the fact that many people lived in accordance with it. Or
consider practices of discrimination on the basis of sex and disability. To the extent that
these forms of discrimination have been imposed or encouraged by law, it is odd to say
that they should be perpetuated on the ground that many people have accepted them. The
Jury Theorem is not easily invoked to suggest that the best way to evaluate social
practices involving the treatment of those with mental illness, or the relationship between
men and women, is to ask a large number of people and to accept the majority’s answer.
As I have suggested, the Equal Protection Clause is the natural source of judicial
skepticism about longstanding practices. By requiring unequal treatment to be justified in
principle, the equal protection guarantee explicitly rejects many minds traditionalism.41
But suppose that no serious equal protection issue is present, and that a tradition is
challenged by those who contend that it has long been imposed rather than freely
accepted. If the contention is correct, the force of the aggregative view is sharply
diminished.
(ii) The Burkean paradox. Adrian Vermeule has drawn attention to the Burkean
paradox42—the possibility that many minds traditionalism will turn out to be selfdefeating. Suppose that people generally follow traditions, not because they believe that
the traditions are good, but because they believe that traditions are likely to embody
collective wisdom. To the extent that people have long behaved in this way, traditions
lose their epistemic credentials, simply because they have been followed by people who
have not made any judgment on their behalf. The Jury Theorem argument works well
only if the practices of those who accept the argument are not taken into account by those
who are deciding whether to accept the argument!
For the aggregative view to work, it must be the case that many of those who have
contributed to the tradition have made an independent judgment on its behalf. In
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Vemeule’s account, this is the Burkean paradox.43 Those who follow traditions, on
Burkean grounds, end up undermining the Burkean defense of traditionalism.
This argument is devastating to due process traditionalism insofar as (a)
established practices are being taken as a sufficient condition for judicial invalidation and
(b) those practices are not a product of the independent judgments of many minds. But
perhaps many minds traditionalism can be justified in terms that deny (b). Let us suppose
that most of those who follow a tradition are usually not doing so mechanically; if the
tradition is evidently silly or harmful, they will reject it. Even the most committed
traditionalists should be willing to rethink their practices if they are evidently destructive
or pointless. But for the aggregative argument, a real problem remains: Many minds
traditionalism has to be discounted to the extent that the relevant traditions have been
followed by those who have not made their own judgments.
(iii) Traditions as cascades. A related problem for the aggregative argument will
arise if people’s judgments are a product of a cascade.44 In an informational cascade,
most people form their judgments on the basis of the actual or apparent judgments of
others.45 Consider a stylized example. Adams says that in her view, the death penalty
deters crime. Barnes does not have a great deal of private information, but having heard
Adams’ belief, she agrees that the death penalty deters crime. Carlton might well believe
that he must have to reliable independent information in order to reject the shared views
of Adams and Barnes—and he lacks that information. If he follows Adams and Barnes on
the ground that their belief is likely to be right, Carlton is in a cascade.
This cascade involves a question of fact: whether the death penalty deters crime.
But it is easy to imagine normative analogues,46 in which Carlton follows Adams and
Barnes, not because not because he independently agrees with them, but because he, like
Barnes, does not have enough confidence in his antecedent normative views to reject the
43
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judgments of others who came before. The general objection is that many traditions may
persist only because of a cascade effect, depriving them of the epistemic credentials
urged by the aggregative view. “Moral panics”47 often reflect cascade effects. Perhaps
some traditions are, to a greater or lesser extent, a product of moral panics. And whether
or not they are, it is easy to imagine traditions that continue through imitative behavior,
ensuring the perpetuation of cascades, rather than independent support from many
minds.48
The best response is that an informational cascade is most unlikely to account for
a tradition, simply because such cascades are quite fragile.49 Suppose that people engage
in certain behavior or accept certain beliefs solely on the ground that other people have
engaged in that behavior or accepted those beliefs. Once private information begins to
emerge, it should defeat the cascade. If people learn that a supposed cure for the common
cold does not work, they will cease purchasing the relevant product. Informational
cascades stop once people have sufficient information to outweigh the signals given by
the acts and statements of their predecessors.
Cascade effects can account for fads and fashions, but they should not be able to
explain longstanding practices, simply because those practices should be exposed if they
are based on falsehoods or do not properly serve the people who participate in them. But
for purposes of due process traditionalism, the problem of cascade effects cannot be
dismissed so easily. Reputational pressures might ensure that people do not break the
cascade, even if their private information suggests that they ought to do so; as a result,
unpopular practices can persist for long periods.50 An additional question is whether in
the relevant domains, people receive a clear signal that the general practice is a bad one.51
An answer to this question requires a shift from the aggregative view to the evolutionary
alternative; I will turn to that alternative momentarily.
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For the moment, it should be clear that on purely aggregative grounds, it is very
hard to defend due process traditionalism. Even if a tradition has been accepted by many
minds, it may not reflect approval of any relevant proposition. Even if it does, those who
created and perpetuated the tradition may suffer from a systematic bias. Even if they do
not, many of them may have simply followed the tradition, rather than independently
agreeing to it. It follows that a longstanding practice provides a fragile basis for judicial
invalidation of democratic outcomes.52 It also follows that even if a practice has been
longstanding, it may lack the credentials that give many minds traditionalism its appeal.
B. The Test of Time
Perhaps due process traditionalists should emphasize the test of time. On one
view, practices are likely to endure if and only if they are good. The central point is that
an enduring tradition must be serving some valuable function; if it were not doing so, it
would not be enduring. As we shall see, this point might ultimately form the foundation
for a democratic conception of traditionalism, one that sees longstanding practices as a
product of numerous “voters” extending over time.
1. “The grown morals of tradition.” The most elaborate version of this view
comes from Hayek.53 Like Burke, Hayek urges that existing moral commitments are not
the product of any single mind; what Hayek adds is that our “undesigned moral
tradition”54 is a product of evolutionary pressures. That moral tradition covers the family
and the rules of property, including “the rules of the stability of possessions, its
transference by consent, and the keeping of promises.”55 Human beings were not clever
enough to design the order “from which billions . . . now draw their sustenance.” On the
contrary, that sustenance comes from our “obedience to traditional customs which were
selected by group evolution without [our] understanding them.” The system of property
rights developed “not because some liked or understood its effects, but because it made
possible the growth of the groups practicing it to grow faster than others.”56
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Hayek explicitly calls attention to evolution in this regard.57 What is crucial is the
process of group selection, which “will select customs whose beneficial assistance to the
survival of men are not perceived by the individuals.” Human beings are dependent for
their survival on the observance of “practices which they cannot rationally justify, and
which may conflict with both their innate instincts on the one hand, and their intellectual
insight on the other.” At least this is so for “the grown morals of tradition.”58 In Hayek’s
hands, the villain of the piece is rationalism, which attempts to deduce moral principles
from reason.59 (The connection with constitutional debates should be plain.) In the end
the “moral tradition remains a treasure which reason cannot replace, but can only
endeavor to improve by immanant criticism, that is, by endeavoring to make a system
which we cannot create as a whole, serve more consistently the same set of interests.”60
What rationalists ridicule as “’the dead hand of tradition’ may contain conditions for the
existence of modern mankind.”61
2. Mechanisms and criteria. Hayek’s arguments, growing out of his work on the
price system,62 have considerable intuitive appeal, but they face a central problem.63
Those who defend traditions by reference to evolutionary accounts must undertake two
independent tasks. First, they must specify the mechanisms by which evolutionary
pressures produce good outcomes. Second, they must offer some kind of account by
which we can judge outcomes to be good. In biology, both the specification and the
account are easy to produce. Natural selection ensures the survival of those who are most
likely to be able to reproduce, and those who have survived are good by reference to the
criterion of reproductive fitness. In the domain of social practices, what is the analogue?
Hayek himself drew directly on natural selection, and if we are speaking literally
of survival, his argument may be on firm ground. Perhaps some moral principles, or
commitments, are necessary or at least extremely helpful for survival of the species. In
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fact it is plausible to say that some such principles are hard-wired and have been
specifically selected by their contribution to human survival.64 Perhaps certain moral
attitudes toward young children, and even respect for property rights, can be understood
in these terms. Indeed, Hayek’s arguments might point to a defense of those forms of
substantive due process that attempt to entrench the evolved moral order.65 But principles
of this kind are most unlikely to be tested in modern substantive due process cases. If
people are given a right to use contraceptives, to use marijuana or sexual devices, to seek
physician-assisted suicide, to wear motorcycles without helmets, or to engage in samesex relations, the species will not be endangered. Human survival may well depend on
some kind of system of property rights, but does it really depend on those aspects of
traditional morality that are challenged in courts via a more critical or rationalist
approach to the due process clause? Even if it did, many due process claims do not reject
traditions; they simply cannot claim strong roots in traditions.
Perhaps survival is beside the point. Perhaps we should say that an enduring
practice is likely, by definition, to promote economic efficiency (or some other
conception of human welfare). If evolution is not at work, perhaps the mechanism is a
form of market competition. The notion of customary law, emphasized by Hayek himself,
is helpful here.66 To the extent that commercial practices are a product of a spontaneous
order, those practices might operate to promote efficiency. If efficiency is desirable in the
commercial domain, judges and legislatures might build on those practices, rather than
displacing them by reference to theories of their own.67 But what, exactly, is the market
that produces traditional morality, and why is it so clear that this particular market
functions well? Why should invisible hand mechanisms, or spontaneous orders, be
celebrated in the moral domain68? Consider the set of practices that have been or might
be challenged in due process cases: bans on the use of contraceptives, on abortion, on
same-sex relations, on certain living arrangements, on same-sex marriage, on physician64
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assisted suicide, on the use of sexual aids or certain drugs. To the extent that such bans
are time-honored, it is clear that the political market has long favored them. But in a
democracy, the political market hardly guarantees efficiency, and it need not promote
welfare69; the role of collective action problems, incomplete information, and interestgroup pressures need not be belabored here.70
Even if the relevant “market” did promote efficiency, it remains necessary to
defend the proposition that efficient traditions should be upheld because they are
efficient.71 In the commercial realm, it is plausible to say that courts should generally
respect practices that have evolved in a way that ensures efficiency. But why should the
due process clause should be read to promote economic efficiency?
The evolutionary defense of many minds traditionalism turns out to be extremely
fragile, at least in due process cases. To accept that defense, we would need to identify
mechanisms that ensure that longstanding practices are good by reference to some
constitutionally relevant criterion. In the absence of such mechanisms, the most that
might be said is that even if evolutionary practices offer no guarantees, the likelihood of
judicial error is so high that judges do best if they attend to traditions. I will explore this
claim below. But unless judges are wholly at sea, it might be best to explore whether the
practice in question is, in fact, good, or good enough, by reference to a constitutionally
relevant criterion.72 Evolutionary pressures are beside the point.
C. Democratic Traditionalism
Perhaps it would be possible to understand many minds traditionalism in general,
and the tests of numbers and time in particular, in a different way. On one view, the
judgments of many people, extending over long periods, deserve respect on essentially
democratic grounds. The claim is not that those judgments are necessarily right or true. It
is instead that they are, in a sense, votes; and if the same votes have been made by
multiple generations, then they deserve respect. We might descrive this approach as a
69
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kind of democratic traditionalism. It supports traditionalist approaches to the due process
clause not on the epistemic grounds suggested by the aggregative and evolutionary
accounts, but on the theory that if so many citizens have committed themselves to a
practice, their judgments deserve judicial deference for that very reason. Justice Scalia,
speaking for a plurality of the Court, has spoken in just these terms, suggesting that
consultation of specific traditions ensures that judges will remain faithful to “the society’s
views.”73
To be sure, it is difficult to see either Burke or Hayek themselves as democrats;
both of them had serious reservations about self-government as an organizing ideal.74 But
if traditions have been created and repeatedly affirmed by free citizens, they might well
be defended on democratic grounds. Courts might be asked to consult those traditions,
and to uphold them, on the ground that the judges’ “private stock of wisdom” has far less
legitimacy than do practices that so many people have voluntarily accepted.
The initial problem for this defense of due process traditionalism is that
democratic processes might and often do reject longstanding practices. Suppose, for
example, that a democratic public challenges practices of discrimination on the basis of
sex or sexual orientation, or that a democratic public concludes that the occupancy of
buildings should be narrowly limited to “a few categories of related individuals.”75 On
democratic grounds, why should the old tradition prevail over the current judgment?
Democratic traditionalists will want to reply that longstanding practices have survived the
test of time, but we have seen many problems with that particular test. For this reason,
democratic traditionalists might have to agree that longstanding practices must yield
before an explicit democratic repudiation. Perhaps they will ask for a clear democratic
judgment in opposition to the tradition; but if such a judgment has been made, traditions
will have to bow before democracy.76
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What remains, for such traditionalists, is the narrower but nonetheless important
claim that courts should not lightly reject longstanding practices on their own; if a
plaintiff’s claim cannot find support in such practices, judges should reject it. This
approach is undoubtedly attractive, for it might be seen as doubly democratic. First, it
refuses to permit plaintiffs to attack longstanding practices; second, the refusal operates
to support existing legislation against judicial attack. The problem with this position is
that for reasons explored above, traditions may lack anything like a good democratic
pedigree. They might be an imposition. They might reflect a systematic bias. People
might have supported traditions not because they are good, but because they are
following their predecessors. The problems with the aggregative and evolutionary
accounts turn out to beset democratic traditionalism as well.
To be sure, those problems are not entirely devastating. We could imagine
domains in which practices are not an imposition, are unlikely to reflect a bias, and have
been perpetuated by a large number of independent judgments. But in many cases in
which longstanding practices are challenged, democratic traditionalism will not have
much force.
III. Traditionalism as a Second-Best Solution
Even if the aggregative and evolutionary accounts turn out to be unconvincing,
and even if democratic traditionalism is rejected, we can imagine other grounds for due
process traditionalism. Most obviously, the effort to root substantive due process in
longstanding practices might operate as a second-best substitute for another, preferable
approach.
A. First-Best, Second-Best
Many people believe that the due process clause is purely procedural and that the
whole idea of substantive due process is textually unrooted.77 On this view, the best
approach would be to abandon substantive due process altogether. But even if this is so, it
would seem too late in the day to take that approach, which would challenge not merely
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the most controversial exercises in substantive due process,78 but also a range of
decisions that are firmly entrenched in constitutional law.79 If those decisions are taken as
given, due process traditionalism might be seen to be a second-best substitute for the
complete abandonment of substantive due process. With due process traditionalism, it
should be possible to prevent other ventures in substantive due process while also
preserving a great deal of the doctrinal status quo.
There is a second view for which due process traditionalism might be a secondbest substitute. Suppose that we embrace the position associated with James Bradley
Thayer, which asks judges to defer to any plausible understanding of the Constitution.80
Thayer insisted that because the American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who
decide on its meaning must inevitably exercise discretion.81 Thayer thought that courts
should strike down laws only “when those who have the right to make laws have not
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to
rational question.”82 The question for courts “is not one of the mere and simple
preponderance of reasons for or against, but of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond
a reasonable doubt . . . .”83 For committed Thayerians, aggressive decisions under the due
process clause are objectionable not because substantive due process does not exist, but
solely because of their aggressiveness; courts should give democratic processes the
benefit of every doubt.
It should be easy to see how due process traditionalism might be a second-best
substitute for a Thayerian approach to the Constitution. Suppose it is believed that very
few legislative decisions will actually violate longstanding understandings of rights, and
that most plaintiffs, invoking the due process clause, will be attempting not to vindicate
traditions but to create new rights grounded in some theory of what people should be able
to do—as, for example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,84 Roe v. Wade,85 and Lawrence v.
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Texas.86 If this is so, then due process traditionalism is likely to operate as a kind of
shield for government, one that produces results identical to those that would be achieved
by a Thayerian approach to the Constitution. It is for this reason that committed
Thayerians, aware that their general approach is both inconsistent with current law and
unlikely to receive widespread assent, might be drawn to due process traditionalism. In
fact it is easy to imagine an incompletely theorized agreement between proceduralists and
Thayerians, both taking traditionalism as an acceptable second-best.
Here is a different way to understand the basic point. To decide difficult cases,
judges must identify their preferred approach to constitutional provisions; they must also
ask how that approach can be squared with existing law. If judges are committed to stare
decisis, they might have to depart from the reasoning and the results suggested by their
preferred approach. From one perspective, the departure is actually the first-best, because
it incorporates the (principled) commitment to respecting past rulings. When I describe
traditionalism as a second-best, it is with the understanding that if the slate were clean, a
procedural approach, or a Thayerian one, would be preferable.
B. Three Problems
For both camps, however, there are serious problems.
1. Traditions can be swords. Traditionalism can operate as a sword against
government, not merely a shield in government’s favor. To that extent, it disserves the
goals of those who seek to cabin the role of substantive due process. In striking down
President Bush’s effort to use military commissions to try suspected terrorists, the Court
relied heavily on its judgment that conspiracy counts had not, by tradition, been subject to
trial in military courts.87 The Court’s decision was not based on the due process clause, of
course, but it would not exactly be stunning to find that traditionalism could lead to
invalidations no less than validations. Indeed, two of the most prominent due process
cases do exactly that. Justice Harlan defended the outcome in Griswold by reference to
what he describes as the longstanding tradition of respect for sexual privacy within
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marriage,88 and Justice Harlan’s view is now largely taken to provide the most plausible
understanding of Griswold.89 In any event, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v.
City of Cleveland90 struck down a ban on family living arrangements on the ground that
the ban was inconsistent with longstanding traditions.91
Perhaps second-best defenses of due process traditionalism might recognize that
on some occasions, the approach will require invalidation. But perhaps the fear of
invalidation should not be taken as devastating to the second-best project, because new
practices will frequently be distinguishable from those that came before, and hence will
rarely be struck down under a traditionalist approach. On this view, Griswold and Moore
are outliers, and unlikely to have many successors. It is true that traditions may turn out
to be swords, but traditionalists will insist that their approach will rarely require
invalidation of democratically approved legislation.
2. Traditions unleashed. Even if this is so, there is an additional problem.
Traditions can be read at many different levels of generality, ranging from the highly
particularistic to the very abstract.92 Because traditions can be read abstractly, due
process traditionalism might not constrain discretion at all. On the contrary, it might turn
out to be an invitation for judges to invalidate practices however they see fit. If judges
read American traditions to create a right to sexual autonomy, bans on prostitution and
incest would face serious constitutional doubts. If judges read American traditions to
suggest a right of free choice in the domain of marriage, bans on same-sex marriage
would seem to be in constitutional jeopardy. Perhaps any characterization of a tradition
will be interpretive in the sense that it is inevitably an effort not simply to describe
something, but to cast past practices in the best constructive light.93 If this is so, judges
will disagree about the appropriate characterization, because they will disagree about
what counts as the best constructive light; and their disagreements will defeat the goals of
those who favor proceduralism or Thayerism.
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To avoid these problems, and to ensure that due process traditionalism will
actually operate as a second-best, proceduralists and Thayerians have to urge that
traditions, to count as such, must be read at a low level of specificity.94 Specific readings
are necessary both to cabin judicial discretion and to ensure that judges behave (roughly)
in a way that proceduralists and Thayerians approve.95 Thus Justice Scalia has urged that
the problem with general readings is that they provide “such imprecise guidance” and
“permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views”; and if judges are not
bound “by any particular, identifiable tradition,” they are not bound by the “rule of law at
all.”96 Perhaps due process traditionalism can operate as a second-best, and in any case
succeed in disciplining judicial discretion, if past practices are read at a level of great
specificity.
A skeptic might respond that if past practices are so read, they will not offer
guidance at all. Read specifically, traditions govern only the periods and persons to
whom they actually applied. There does appear to be a tradition in favor of allowing
parents to have as many children as they like. But as we have seen, that tradition, read at
a level of great specificity, may not “apply” in any context in which democratic processes
have repudiated them. A traditionalist must acknowledge that specific readings of past
practices will have an irreducible interpretive dimension—enabling the judge to explain
whether current circumstances are relevantly different, so as to render the tradition
inapplicable. If a due process traditionalist will not allow states to restrict couples to two
children, or to ban married people from using contraceptives, it must be because any
difference between the past and the present is deemed irrelevant.
But perhaps Justice Scalia, and other traditionalists, need not be disturbed by this
concession. In insisting that traditions must be read at a high level of specificity, they are
saying only that judges must avoid general characterizations that turn traditionalism into
a license for highly discretionary judgments about the substantive content of liberty. If
this is their claim, their real problem is empirical, not conceptual: If specific readings are
unlikely, then due process traditionalism will fail to serve as a second-best. Optimistic
94

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 (1989).
At the same time, specific readings will appeal to many minds traditionalists, who believe that the
specific traditions have epistemic credentials, because those are the traditions of which many minds have
approved.
96
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 (1989).
95

25

proceduralists and Thayerians will think that failure is avoidable, and they will work hard
to vindicate their optimism. They will devote every effort to reading traditions in such a
way as to reduce the risks of open-ended judicial judgments. But as a matter of actual
practice, their efforts might fail. Traditionalist approaches to individual rights might well
turn out to be unstable.
3. First-best? The second-best defense of due process traditionalism will lack
much appeal for those who count neither proceduralism nor Thayerism as a first-best. It
is true that the text of the due process clause is naturally read to be purely procedural, but
there are countervailing indications in the history of the fourteenth amendment,97 and in
any event the existence of a substantive component is well-settled.98 Within the legal
culture, there seems to be broad and deep convergence on some form of substantive due
process, captured in the view that certain intimate choices deserve protection against
democratic intrusions, at least if those intrusions cannot be convincingly justified. To the
extent that a purely procedural reading of the due process clause is unappealing, secondbest justifications of due process traditionalism will seem weak.
Thayerism has been defended quite powerfully,99 but it has no supporters on the
Supreme Court, and it will hardly seem a first-best to those who believe that in some
domains, relatively aggressive forms of substantive due process are both legitimate and
desirable. To defend due process traditionalism as a second-best for Thayerism, it is
necessary to convince skeptics both that they should prefer a Thayerian approach to the
due process clause and that traditionalism is a reasonable way of adopting the basic goals
of that approach. Skeptics will not be easily persuaded.
VI. Rule-Consequentialism
There is a final possibility. Perhaps due process traditionalism can be justified on
rule-consequentialist grounds.100 The basic idea is that if judges are unleashed from
traditions, they will produce many bad results, and that if judges are tethered to traditions,
they will do fairly well—simply because our particular traditions, with respect to
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substantive rights, outperform any catalogue likely to be produced by judges. At least this
might be so if we consider the fact that democratic majorities, at the state or federal level,
can create substantive rights if they choose to do so.
A basic concern here is that the idea of “liberty,” taken in the abstract, can be read
in diverse ways, and there is no particular reason to trust judicial readings, even or
perhaps especially if they are morally infused. It is true that the aggregative and
evolutionary accounts offer insufficient reason to accept many minds traditionalism in its
most ambitious forms, but the real question is comparative, and perhaps we can agree that
at least in the United States, traditional conceptions of individual rights are good place to
start. When such conceptions prove inadequate, political processes can and often do pick
up the slack, as for example through statutory protections accorded to privacy rights.101
And when traditions are palpably unjust, the Equal Protection Clause is the natural route
by which they might be challenged. If judicial judgments about the substantive content of
“liberty” are highly unreliable, due process traditionalism might turn out to be the best
imaginable approach.
The underlying questions cannot be answered in the abstract; they call for both
normative and predictive judgments. Due process traditionalists might reasonably believe
that judicial judgments will reflect normative commitments that do not deserve special
respect and that in any case ought not to be imposed on citizens. Lochner v. New York,102
prompting Holmes’ traditionalism, is the obvious example for most, whereas Roe v.
Wade103 is the salient example for many. Those who reject due process traditionalism
insist that judicial elaboration of the content of “liberty” is far more likely to produce
better outcomes than an approach that is tied to longstanding practices. They favor a
more rationalist or critical approach to the due process clause, in which judges question
traditions by the light of reason, ensuring that they can survive the appropriate standard
of review.
If such an approach is to be defended, it might be on the institutional grounds
sketched by Alexander Bickel, who insisted that “courts have certain capacities for
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dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess.”104 In
Bickel’s view, “judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation
follow the ways of the scholar” in thinking about those enduring values.105 “Their
insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to men’s better
natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment’s
hue and cry.”106 Thus Bickel concluded that “no other branch of government is nearly so
well equipped to conduct” a kind of vital natural seminar, through which the most basic
principles are discovered and announced.107
To those who fear the exercise of judicial discretion, it might be responded that
the appointments process, together with internal restraints on judicial judgments,108
creates sufficient protection against the relevant risks. Judges do not create due process
doctrine out of whole cloth; they rely on their previous decisions, and they rarely depart
radically from them. If Bickel is right about judicial capacities, and if the external and
internal constraints on judicial discretion are real, the rule-consequentialist defense of due
process traditionalism is unlikely to seem unconvincing. We are better off if traditions are
a place to start but not to end, and if courts occasionally deploy a more critical approach,
testing whether the tradition is sensible in principle. It is not clear that the underlying
disagreement can be resolved in the abstract; it depends on both normative judgments and
predictions about judicial performance. But at least we should now be in a position to
identify the questions on which reasonable people might disagree.
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Conclusion
The most ambitious defenses of due process traditionalism, drawing on Burke and
Hayek, emphasize that many minds are necessary to constitute a tradition, and that many
minds are far more likely to be right than those who deploy their private stock of reason.
The aggregative version of this view runs into three problems. First, numerous people
may not have accepted a proposition that is relevant to the legal issue at hand. Second,
many minds might suffer from a systematic bias. Third, people may have participated in a
cascade, depriving the tradition of the degree of support that the aggregative view
demands. The problem with the evolutionary account is that it is hard to identify a
mechanism to ensure that traditional practices are good, or even good enough, in any
relevant sense. Democratic traditionalists insist that longstanding practices are supported
by numerous “votes.” But at least for the problems typically raised in due process cases,
the same difficulties that undermine the aggregative and evolutionary accounts beset
efforts to defend traditions on democratic grounds.
Alternative defenses see due process traditionalism as a kind of second-best
substitute for a procedural account of the due process clause or for a form of Thayerism.
Ideas of this sort undoubtedly help explain the appeal of due process traditionalism
within the judiciary. If “substantive due process” is constitutionally baseless but firmly
entrenched, a traditionalist approach might seem the best way out of a bad situation.
Unfortunately, the substitute is likely to be quite crude, and it is not clear that a
procedural account or Thayerism can be convincingly described as first-best.
It is also possible to defend due process traditionalism in rule-consequentialist
terms. The central idea would be that notwithstanding the failures of the aggregative and
evolutionary accounts, our own traditions are generally good, and judicial judgments
about the content of “liberty” are systematically unreliable. The rule-consequentialist
argument cannot easily be rejected in the abstract. On the one hand, it is easy to imagine
a world in which the rule-consequentialist argument might be persuasively defended. On
the other hand, it is doubtful that this world is our own.
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